Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Although non-governmental organisations (NGOs), along with States and individuals, began to submit amicus curiae briefs 1 to the European Court two decades ago and contribute in many ways to the work of the Court, little is known about this practice. In general, in Europe, little attention has been paid to civil society initiatives when it comes to legal mobilization, 2 reinforced in this case by the lack of empirical data readily available to scholars.
Th e European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 'was the fi rst international human rights instrument to aspire to protect a broad range of civil and political rights both by taking the form of a treaty legally binding on its High Contracting Parties and by establishing a system of supervision over the implementation of the rights at the domestic level'. 3 It created the European Court of Human Rights, located in Strasbourg, which monitors State compliance with the Convention. Today, its jurisdiction extends over 47 member States and more than 800 million people. Th e signifi cance of the Court and its case law in Europe and beyond is undeniable. 4 Th e Court stated itself that 'Although the primary purpose of the Convention system is to provide individual relief, its mission is also to determine issues on public-policy grounds in the common interest, thereby raising the general standards of protection of human rights and extending human rights jurisprudence throughout the community of Convention States'. 5 Th us, it is not surprising that interest groups such as NGOs became willing to get involved in the Court proceedings.
Th is exploratory research focuses on mapping the interventions of human rights NGOs before the Court. Th e interest for the topic lies in the fact that despite their essential role, no empirical work has examined the phenomenon so far; 6 that articles focusing on third-party interventions seem to always cite the same 'famous' or welldocumented third-party interventions; and that an increasing trend of participation 1 Henceforth, amicus curiae briefs will be referred to as 'amicus briefs' or 'briefs' and fi lers of amicus briefs will be referred to as 'amici '. 2 Frances Zemans defi nes legal mobilization as 'the translation of a […] want into a demand framed as an assertion of rights'; F Zemans, 'Th e Neglected Role of the Law in the Political System ' (1983) 77 Th e American Political Science Review 690, 700. 273 is taking place, as can be illustrated by the case of Lautsi v Italy. 7 Th e aim of this research was thus fi rst to establish a database as complete as possible and then to identify and analyse some of the trends. Th is should give a more accurate idea of what is occurring and hopefully provide a corpus for future research (for example studies that concentrate on impact measurement).
Written comments can be submitted before the ECtHR by 'any State or person concerned not party to the proceedings'. 8 However, this research focuses on interventions by one of the largest and most prolifi c type of intervener -nongovernmental organisations dedicated to the promotion and protection of human rights 9 -with the aim of illustrating their growing presence at this supranational level. 10 Th e next section sets the theoretical framework characterizing the topic, looking at the evolving defi nition of the amicus curiae device and at the roles scholars have attributed to it. It then looks at the Court's position towards it and outlines the applicable procedure. A brief point will explain, from a methodological point of view, how the database was constructed. Th e last section analyses the results, depicting the practice of amicus curiae before the Court in terms of numbers. More specifi cally, it looks at the concerned organisations and the cases in which amici appear.
THE AMICUS CURIAE: ORIGIN, ROLES AND PROCEDURE

THE AMICUS CURIAE: DEFINITION AND ROLES
A traditional translation of amicus curiae is 'a friend of the court'. Th e term is applied 'to a bystander, who without having an interest in the cause, of his own knowledge 7
Lautsi v Italy App no 30814/06 (ECtHR, 18 March 2011) . Aft er a Chamber unanimously ruled that the compulsory display of a religious symbol in classrooms restricted the right of parents to educate their children in conformity with their convictions, and the right of children to believe or not to believe, it was referred to the Grand Chamber. It received an unprecedented number of third-party interventions: ten States (with two having issued statements of support), ten NGOs and a group of members of the European Parliament provided briefs. Two groups were not granted the right to intervene and only the States were allowed to take part in the public hearings. 8 Article 36(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights. Th ere are three main classes of persons whose intervention is welcomed by the Court: States, the Human Rights Commissioner and persons with an interest in the case. Under the last, there are individuals other than the applicant with a clear interest in the domestic proceedings to which an application before the ECtHR relates; entities, groups or individuals with relevant specialist legal expertise or factual knowledge (like NGOs, national groups, experts), a few industry interest groups, but also international organisations.
Intersentia makes suggestion on a point of law or of fact for the information of the presiding judge '. 11 Since its inception under the English common law system, 12 the use of the amicus curiae status has undergone change and modifi cation. 'Most notably, the amicus device evolved into a means of representing third-party interest potentially aff ected by ongoing litigation'. 13 Particularly prominent in the US, 14 the traditional concept of amicus as a neutral bystander has also evolved, legitimately performing an advocacy function. Since the 1990s amici curiae have become more prominent before international courts and tribunals 15 and have played a major role in the context of courts specialized in human rights. 16 Procedurally, it can be said that 'the history of the amicus device hinges on a single principle: fl exibility'. 17 Usually, courts retain a broad discretionary power over all aspects of amicus participation: 18 on who can be an amicus; on whether or not it permits them; on the form of that participation; and the scope of the submissions. 19 As the existing literature (which focuses mainly on American and international courts) has largely examined the roles and functions traditionally assigned to amicus curiae, they will just be briefl y summarized here.
First, in line with their historical presence before courts, an amicus curiae provides information. Th is can take the form of legal expertise or factual information. 20 Th e amicus can also inform the court of the broader consequences of the cases, by showing the potential implications of a decision or to point out unintended consequences for people or groups not party to the suit. 21 Many authors grant a prominent place 11 B Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases cited by S Krislov, 'Th e Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy ' (1963) 72 Th e Yale Law Journal 694-721. 12 For a historical review see Krislov (n 11); E Angell, 'Th e Amicus Curiae American Development of English Institutions ' (1967) Ibid. 20 On the broader consequences it can yield see J Smith, R Pagnucco, and G Lopez, 'Globalizing Human Rights: Th e Work of Transnational Human Rights NGOs in the 1990s ' (1998) to the role of representation of the public interest. 22 Of course, 'the extent to which NGOs represent the public interest is a matter of some debate. In general, NGOs will represent what they deem to be in the public interest'. 23 Amicus curiae can also raise the attention of public opinion, playing 'an important role in a democratic court system' 24 as they open dialogue. Th is goes hand in hand with the amicus participation's contribution to the institutional legitimacy of courts, which, among others, depends on some form of inclusion. 25 At last, especially in the area of human rights, amicus curiae briefs by NGOs remind diff erent parties that they are acting as a watchdog, sending a signal to States that they remain vigilant on particular issues. 26 Finally, from the group's perspective, participation in courts helps it pursue its policies. It can legitimize the organisation, signal involvement to its own members, attract new members 27 and promote fund-raising. 28 Applied to the European Court of Human Rights in particular, Ludovic Hennebel found the following trends relating to the role of infl uence of amici. First, that the Court draws in the briefs necessary elements to affi rm the existence of a European or international consensus. Second, it draws inspiration from legal solutions adopted in other systems and third, it relies on the briefs to underscore the diff erent interests at play in a case. 29 A recently conducted survey among 20 NGOs active before the European Court of Human Rights 30 made apparent that the principal objectives pursued by the groups are to challenge national laws, practices and interpretations, to establish precedents, to inform and infl uence the Court and to extend the interpretation given to the Convention. 42 and one where a third-party seeks to provide information to the Court on its own initiative. Acceptance of such briefs is 'at the discretion of the President of the Court'. 43 Rule 44 provides that, once notice of an application has been given to the respondent State, the President of the Chamber may invite, or grant leave to, any person concerned who is not the applicant, to submit written comments or, in 36 Hennebel (n 29) 644; De Schutter (n 32). -be non-profi t; and -have as a primary concern the protection or promotion of one or more human rights.
Th erefore, groups whose primary goal is not the defence of human rights such as professional associations have been excluded. 49 From the results thus obtained, interventions from groups which do not qualify under this defi nition (such as professional associations, international organisations and national human rights institutions) were fi ltered out.
However, using only the HUDOC database is problematic as there are still imperfections: 1) it appears that the Court has occasionally 'forgotten' to mention an amicus; 50 2) it sometimes (fortunately rarely) only mentions 'a third-party intervener' without specifying who; and fi nally 3) the third-party interventions in pending cases are not be found until there is a judgment. In order to complete the list of NGOs other methods were used: the internet was searched and the websites of NGOs that appeared in the fi rst research stage were further scrutinized. Lists of the briefs thus identifi ed were sent to the issuing organisations to obtain confi rmation that they were exhaustive. Th e fi nal number at the time of writing is 294 briefs submitted in 237 cases. While the number of collected briefs must be close to reality, some may admittedly have been missed. 51 A coding sheet has been established to record the information systematically and can be found in the Appendix to this article.
4.
PRACTICE [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . Figure 1 illustrates the increase in terms of amicus participation the Court has witnessed in recent years. 52 49 However, some of them remain in the fi nal list if they are part of a joint intervention made with an NGO meeting the criteria. Th e criteria have been understood broadly, so as to include groups which fi ght for the recognition of a human right (such as the right to die in dignity) and to include law school clinics as well as umbrella organisations of NGOs.
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See column 8 of the Results in the Appendix.
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And are probably condemned to belong to the dustbin of history if the archives of the Court do not undertake action and/or the NGOs do not publicize their old briefs.
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Th e numbers for 2013 have not been included as they could not be representative. Since its creation, the Court has delivered more than 17,000 judgments. 53 Since the 1998 reform, there has been a considerable increase in the Court's caseload and today approximately 113,350 applications are pending. 54 As third-party interventions of human rights NGOs have been identifi ed in 237 cases, relatively speaking, these amici curiae have thus participated in only 1.3 per cent of the ECtHR's proceedings. It is interesting to note that the ratio is higher before the Grand Chamber. Th e Grand Chamber, composed of more judges than the 'normal' chambers, 55 has a special role in safeguarding a unifi ed interpretation of the Convention and preventing risks of inconsistency among judgments. Th e cases that raise the most important and leading legal issues 56 end up before this body in either of two ways: 57 either the parties request referral of the decision they obtained from a Chamber or, more frequently, the assigned Chamber decides to relinquish the case to the Grand Chamber. Th e Grand Chamber has delivered 307 judgments in total 58 and saw NGOs' interventions in 65 of them -that is in 21 per cent of the cases.
Intersentia
For common law scholars and practitioners, these numbers can appear very low, particularly in comparison with the US Supreme Court, 59 and it might seem diffi cult to understand why interest groups do not participate or even seek to participate more. First, it should be stressed that some requests to intervene are not accepted. However, those numbers should not radically change the ratio described above as only about 20 'refusals' could be found. Again, the lack of offi cial data is even truer in the latter, where the judges mention them on a purely ad-hoc basis. According to most scholars and litigating groups that have been surveyed, 60 the ECtHR has demonstrated that it is particularly receptive to amicus participation and 'leave to intervene by way of written submissions is almost always granted'. 61 Yet, according to a previous Registrar of the Court (and newly elected judge), Paul Mahoney, a lot of requests are refused. 62 Th e reasons for not granting leave (once the procedural requirements are fulfi lled) seem to fall into three categories: 'either the information sought to be provided concerns States other than the defendant State, or the issues do not present a suffi ciently proximate connection with the case before the Court or the intervention is not seen as necessary by the Court'. 63 To these reasons, according to one NGO interviewed, a not clearly defi ned 'political' one should be added to this list. 64 However, the Court's current Deputy Registrar explained that if some judges and member States 'had previously been somewhat uncertain about the value of interventions' 65 the Court has today 'a healthy practice' of interventions and even promotes them. 66 Bartholomeusz suggests that 'for those familiar with the Court's practice, it is probably clear when applications for third-party intervention are likely to be successful. If this is correct, the low number of refused requests for intervention might be explained on the basis that, if a request has little likelihood of success, it is unlikely to be made at all '. 67 1946-1955 and the 1986-1995 
Among the many factors 68 that could be outlined to explain these diff erences but which are beyond the scope of this article (aspects of legal culture and tradition, state of civil society, and so on) there is one that should be developed: the fact that much of the Court's caseload is repetitive. Because of the right of individual petition, 'only a fraction of all admissible cases raises a new question of human rights law'. 69 Th ere are, for example, 'huge numbers of cases based on the length of proceedings and multiple cases about expropriation of property, and the non-execution of judgments', 70 which involve 'routine application of well-established case law'. 71 In these repetitive cases, which are estimated to represent some 60 per cent of the potentially well-founded cases, 72 it is understandable that there is no eagerness or rationale to inform or infl uence the Court. It remains, however, true that, even if these cases were excluded from the calculus, the participation rate of interveners remains very low.
Finally, when granting leave, the Court oft en prescribes time-limits for receiving the submissions and the maximum length of the briefs. Sometimes it also indicates the scope or the question to be answered by the amicus. Finally, the Court will sometimes grant oral participation where such participation might be particularly useful in complementing written submissions, but this is particularly rare. 73
WHO ARE THE THIRD-PARTY INTERVENERS? MEETING THE ACTORS
Who are the human rights NGOs active before the Court? 142 diff erent NGOs have been identifi ed as matching the criteria and can be found in column 6 of the table (see  Appendix) . Far from forming a homogeneous group, it is diffi cult to give a general picture of these actors. Some are transnational NGOs and others are small, local associations.
68
'External' factors play a role such as the diffi culty of obtaining information about submitted cases, the lenghty proceedings before the Court, the restrictive rules on third-party interventions (especially the time requirement) as well as 'internal' factors such as the lack of fi nancial or human resources: L Van den Eynde (n 30) 315-323. See, for other practical considerations which might have a bearing on NGOs' choice to intervene: Hodson, (n 6) 53-55. Among the many criteria that help categorizing NGOs, 74 the criteria of the geographical origin and the substantive area of concern in the human rights fi eld have been selected. Th ese criteria will thus be the subject of further analysis, through the determination of their legal status, their primary operating base and their aims (on the basis of their offi cial websites). Aft er a short picture, three observations will be made.
Th e Geographical Origin
Th is data only indicates the main seat of the NGOs and not their territorial scope of action. 
Th e Substantive Area(s) of Concern in the Human Rights Field
For the purpose of clarity, the groups can be classifi ed according to their area of focus or mandate. 76 mandates, encompassing human rights in general and not defi ning a territorial scope of action on which they focus. Th is group is principally composed of well-known groups such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Open Society Justice Initiative, International Commission of Jurists, and so on. Second, a large group of NGOs defi ne their action in the human rights fi eld primarily with reference to a group of persons. Th ese focus mainly on: 1) migrants and refugees; 2) gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people; 3) Roma people; 4) children; 5) prisoners; 6) minorities in general, 7) journalists, 8) disabled persons, 9) lawyers, 10) migrant domestic workers; and 11) Christians. Th ird, a quarter of the interveners focus specifi cally on one category of rights (or even some particular aspects of that category), such as freedom of expression, freedom of thought and religion, freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, disability rights, freedom of information, and so on. Finally, a few NGOs have broad mandates in terms of issues, but their actions are limited to particular territories (for example Russia or Northern Ireland). Figure 3 illustrates this diversity among the NGOs. 
Th ree observations:
Presence of Repeat Players
Th is graph, Figure 4 below, shows the groups that have intervened more than fi ve times before the Court. 77 Taken together, the activity of these NGOs accounts for 82 per cent of all amicus briefs presented. Another feature worth underlining is the recent appearance of groups that can be labelled as 'conservative'. Th e phenomenon has been observed before the US Supreme Court already for three decades and since then, conservative and libertarian legal advocacy groups have multiplied and gained currency. 86 Defi ned primarily by the socially conservative causes they espouse and by the interests they represent (oft en business, employers and so on), O'Connor and Epstein included in this category groups that reveal 'a consistent ideological pattern'. 87 It is natural that they appeared before the ECtHR as well, as '[t]he debate about the nature and content of human rights refl ects, aft er all, a struggle for power and for favoured conceptions of the 'good society''. 88 
Joint Interventions
A joint intervention is an amicus brief prepared and signed by more than one organisation. Th e advantage of doing so is that NGOs rely on more expertise, share the burden of work, avoid repetitions and give more weight to their intervention, so as to avoid being rejected by the Court. As the report of one NGO underlined, 'there is a healthy tradition of NGO coalitions intervening in high-profi le cases'. 93 And indeed, out of the 294 amicus briefs presented so far to the Court, 92 are joint interventions. For example, the Al-Skeini case, arising from the death of six Iraqi civilians and related to the extraterritorial application of the Convention, involved seven NGOs. Another practice that can be observed are briefs signed by one NGO or an expert on behalf of other groups. Some NGOs clearly have established patterns of cooperation, while others tend to play more solo. With regard to repeat players, it is interesting to note that many briefs see the involvement of a repeat player accompanied by one or more groups that appear only once. Th ese 'one-shotters' are oft en smaller organisations and/or have expertise in one particular fi eld only. Reasons for being part of joint interventions are most probably that the repeat players have the knowhow concerning the procedure and already enjoy legitimacy, and/or that these other groups have similar interests than the ones pursued by NGOs but are maybe not used to framing them in the human rights discourse or in the form of an amicus brief. Finally, in cases where the NGOs do not intervene jointly in a case, they sometimes explain that they have 'divided' the work or at least do not touch upon issues covered by others. 94
CASES IN WHICH THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTIONS ARE OBSERVED: DEFENDANT STATES ON THE HOT SEAT AND THE INFLUENCE ON THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE
Th is section looks at the cases in which human rights NGOs intervened and more particularly at the defendant States involved in these cases and the rates of admissibility and fi ndings of violations in these cases. Th is section attempts to answer the following two questions: 1) whether there is a link between the geographical origin of NGOs and 93 JUSTICE (n 44) 90.
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For example the brief of Liberty and JUSTICE in the case Ramzy v the Netherlands App no 25424/05 (ECtHR, 20 July 2010) states: 'In their respective submissions, each group of third party interveners reviews the relevant statements of international, regional or domestic bodies, but to avoid duplication, the three groups of third party interveners each endeavour to address diff erent aspects of the issue' (para 2).
the cases in which they intervene; and 2) whether one or more interventions by NGOs increase the likelihood of success for the party supported. Th is section will mostly rely on the numbers yielded by the database tool and later compared with the numbers produced by the Court itself on its general docket's statistics.
Th e defendant States
As a point of comparison, the fi rst two fi gures try to give an idea of the States that appear the most oft en before the Court. Figure 5 shows that in the 60 years of the Court's existence, fi ve States count for the majority of judgments fi nding a violation: Turkey, Italy, Russia, France and Poland. 
Figures of admissibility and violations
Th is subsection aims at giving an accurate description of the fi gures relating to admissibility decisions and violation judgments in cases where a human rights NGO has intervened. 294 briefs have been submitted in 237 diff erent cases, of which 41 were still pending at the time of writing. Out of the decided cases, 168 were declared admissible and 20 inadmissible. 101 Eight cases were struck out of the list. Usually, third-party interventions take place at the merits stage. But the new Rule 44 of the Court established in 2003 'enables third-party intervention at an early stage i.e. from the moment of the communication of the application to the respondent government and not only aft er admissibility', 102 as it was before. Intervening for the purpose of deciding admissibility is, however, rare. 103 Th e problem is that Intersentia inadmissibility can be decided without a communication to the responding government, 104 thus without giving third parties the chance to intervene. Except in cases referred to a Chamber that decides to give notice of the application to the respondent States and invites it to submit written observations on the application, 105 it is not possible for NGOs to seek leave to intervene before the admissibility stage.
Concerning fi ndings of violations, authors continue to cite the above-mentioned study of 1994 of Dinah Shelton, 106 which pioneered the fi eld. She included State amicus in her research and her fi ndings suggested that the Court would fi nd violations more oft en in cases with amicus participation (75 per cent of the cases) than without such participation (50 per cent). However, she notes the diffi culty of evaluating the overall rate of success and in addition, having only a very small number of cases at her disposal, she compared the cases 'with interventions' to the cases in which interventions had been refused. Th ese numbers thus suggest that the presence of one or more amicus helps the applicants. 107 Th e numbers produced by our database question this positive correlation. In general, the Court fi nds at least one violation in 83 per cent of the cases that pass the admissibility stage. 108 In cases that involved the participation of one or more human rights NGOs as a third-party intervener, the Court has found at least one violation in 78 per cent of the admissible cases. Moreover, the rate of absence of violation is almost four times higher than for the general docket, which contradicts Shelton's pioneering fi ndings from 1994. Of course it cannot be concluded that this positive correlation does not exist, as it cannot be known what the results would have been without their intervention. Furthermore, a few supplementary factors should be taken into account. First, some human rights NGOs briefs do not support the applicant but the State. Th ey remain a very small minority but with the rise of conservative groups (cf. supra) this proportion might rise. A second factor that should be taken into account -but which goes beyond the scope of this article -is the presence of one or more State amicus (or even others) 'on the other side' that might also infl uence the balance. 109 A third factor that is not refl ected in this number is that stating that a judgment has found the State to be in violation does not determine whether the human rights NGOs have 'won'. Sometimes, indeed, the issues addressed in the briefs are not the ones on which a violation is ultimately found. 110
Figure 8. Findings of violations in ECHR judgments
CONCLUSION
Th is research aimed at producing a database capable of giving an empirically-based picture of the practice of NGOs third-party interventions before the ECtHR. A total of a little bit less than 300 briefs has been found, a number largely superior to what is usually mentioned in the literature. Th e anticipated increase of participation has been confi rmed. Th e percentage of cases in which an intervention has been observed 109 Th e case of Lautsi v Italy (n 7) can undoubtedly be cited. Aft er having ruled against Italy, the 'crucifi x case' was referred to the Grand Chamber. Th ree briefs of human rights NGOs were supporting the applicant and Italy got the support of ten States, one human rights NGO and some other organisations acting together. Th e Grand Chamber reversed the judgment, fi nding no violation.
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For example, in the case Fretté v France App no 36515/97 (ECtHR, 26 February 2002) , the NGO was arguing for the fi nding of a violation on the basis of the right to private life and discrimination and ultimately the Court judged that there had been a violation of Article 6 (right to a fair trial) instead.
Intersentia is low when the total docket is taken into account. However, a bigger percentage is observed concerning Grand Chamber cases. Th is research also fi nds that a large number of interventions are made jointly and involve repeat-players before the Court. Th e interveners form a heterogeneous group, from local activists fi ghting for one particular right to large transnational NGOs, with the noticeable prominent presence of UK-based charities. Th is, however, is changing, and non-British NGOs and new 'less traditional' actors (conservative groups among others) are more and more active. Concerning the type of cases in which they intervene, the United Kingdom is the defendant State that sees their appearance most oft en, probably as a matter of its legal tradition and features of its civil society. Th is suggests that, in addition to the interest that the case might present for the NGOs, their geographical origins might also infl uence their choice to intervene. Finally, the most recent numbers show that the fi ndings of violation by the Court in cases involving third-parties is not higher than for the general docket, on the contrary. At best, it suggests that the NGOs most oft en intervene in cases concerning highly controversial and disputed issues. 
